During his visit to Indonesia, US Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates announced Thursday (July 22) that the US government would lift the ban on the Army’s Special Forces (Kopassus). The military cooperation between the US and Indonesia, Gates asserted, would be based on a measured and gradual program of security cooperation activities.

The US government decided to take the measure following Indonesian military reforms over the past decade, the ongoing professionalization of the Indonesian Military (TNI) and recent measures taken by the Defense Ministry in response to human rights issues.

Despite the US’s commitment to place importance on human rights and accountability, the resumption of ties with Kopassus has attracted rejection abroad and at home. Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont, the author of the law that bans US support to foreign militaries that violate human rights in 1999, believed that Kopassus remains unrepentant, essentially unreformed and unaccountable.

In Indonesia, the Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence had long lobbied the US Congress against resumption of cooperation with the Kopassus without taking two important conditions into account: The unit’s past accountability and Indonesian military reforms.

Current surveys conducted in Indonesia present that Kopassus actually arrives at the point of winning public trust, in contrast to the National Police suffering from lack of public confidence. Widespread opposition to American military reinstatement of ties with Kopassus suggests that the unit still has a long way to go in its reform attempts on three crucial matters.

First, the TNI must show its abilities to respect and defend human rights in practice. On many occasions, TNI generals asked for the public not to accuse their soldiers of violating human rights any more. They argue that human rights education has been integrated into Indonesia’s military schools and training, noting TNI soldiers especially Kopassus are getting familiar with or knowledgeable about human right issues.

However, it is less than enough as Kopassus has failed to reform and the officers accused of human rights crimes continue to serve with the unit. Prabowo Subianto and Sjafrie Sjamsuddin, former Kopassus leaders blamed for gross human rights violations, remain free from any trial or legal cases.

The country’s military court’s position to take no legal action against those violating human rights not only confirms the TNI’s approach to settle human rights cases out of court, but also provides the opportunity for future human rights violations.

Reforming the Indonesian military justice system, therefore, is a must. For years, military suspects are not provided with many of the basic protections in line with the civilian Criminal Code Procedures, such as the right to an immediate trial, right to advice throughout the process, and access to family members or medical treatment.

Things get worse as the Indonesian military justice system has a record of limiting tribunals and sentencing those convicted of serious crimes to extremely light sentences. A credible trial will only succeed if Kopassus cooperates by handing down documents and personnel necessary to prosecuting attorney.

Second, reform of the territorial command structure is needed. Despite the TNI’s political role has terminated, the Indonesian army’s presence at local levels are still there. Such a policy is believed to channel its new power and position into law enforcement, business and even politics.

It is ironic while the TNI’s role in internal security has reduced, the number of regional military commands has increased, like in West Kalimantan and West Papua. The step has great potential to undermine peace efforts in conflict zone such as Papua, unnecessarily spends state budget, and extends over and covers a part of the police function.

Numerous cases at local levels show how military officers are involved in backing businessmen up for land acquisition, harassing, extorting money from, and in some cases using violence against lay people.

Hence, the US military aid to Indonesian military should stipulate a friendly, democratic and humanitarian approach of the TNI’s territorial command structure. The US should ensure that the content and participants in training, joint exercises, and other assistance must be clear of legal and illegal business activities, human rights violations, and surveillance of government critics.

Third, civilian supremacy becomes non-compromised. Military cooperation between the US and Indonesia will be in vain without egging civilian supremacy on. Encouraging civilian supremacy is important to bolster political institutions and democracy, not only to make Indonesian military more professional and capable, but also more accountable.

For that purpose, US military training programs should involve civilians to be trained in security sector reform, among others government officials, parliamentary expert staff and members of think tanks and NGOs that monitor the military.

Failure to inject expertise into legislators and staff would cause civilians to undergo an inferiority complex when it comes to making strategic decisions, particularly with regards to political stability and social security. It is expected that such civilian supremacy will give civilians control of policy or its execution.



The writer is a lecturer at Andalas University, Padang, and a graduate of the University of Canberra, Australia.