The number of casualties related to two inseparable incidents in Papua is likely to increase. Media reports continuously describe the situation in the eastern-most province as deteriorating.
Since thousands of PT Freeport Indonesia gold mine workers in Timika went on a strike to demand a pay rise in mid-September, followed by the Third Papuan People’s Congress, which was attended by 4,000 people in Jayapura in mid-October, more than 10 people have been killed. There is no exact number of people injured, arrested or being hunted by security forces.
Harsher measures by the security forces, indicated by the recent deployment of reinforcement personnel to the province, are likely to result in more victims than victories.
To the eyes of many in civilized society and democratic countries, fatalities and injuries can be avoided if — and only if — the civilized and democratic means of conflict resolution are in place. But, since such widely praised mechanisms are far from being realized, or even seen as unrealistic, this nation seems to be prepared to witness more casualties in Papua, which many envision as a land of peace.
This raises the question of whether the propensity for violence in Papua is inevitable or not. Skeptical elements of opportunistic onlookers will contend that violence in the region is a certainty. They tend to argue that there are armed separatists and unidentified groups who do not want peace and order to prevail in Papua for their particular interests. For these viewers, peace in Papua is unrealistic.
Such a view is understandable, but not necessarily uncontested or accepted. The argument for the inevitability of violence in Papua appears to rely on the fact that many segments of the Papuan people are living in harsh conditions or their lives are worsening. This means the tendency to perpetrate acts of violence is obviously influenced by social and economic problems.
First of all, the so-called security dilemma is prevailing in many areas of the natural resources-rich province. According to the security dilemma perspective, a high level of fear and uncertainty is prevalent. There is a fear-producing environment that drives groups of people to perceive war or acts of violence as a rational course of action.
When the government’s break-down or absence is commonly seen as justification or opportunity to launch a strike and perpetrate violence, as happened in Timor Leste, Poso and Ambon, it is the strong presence of military and police forces that seems to spread fear and insecurity in Papua.
Other conditions that exacerbate the insecure conditions include but are not limited to gaps in the redistribution of economic resources and social-political privileges, not to mention the vastness and geographic isolation of the province.
They hold the view that the violence in Papua is inevitable, at least in the short term, is also associated with the way the government handles the problems. At this point, the central and regional governments are likely to be blamed for the continuing violence in Papua — blame which is simply based on the three elements of conflict resolution: prevention, management and settlement.
First, it is hard to believe that the police and other security-related units failed to anticipate potential threats to public order, regional security or even national integration in any public gathering in Papua. As mass rallies in this country tend to turn ugly, the case of the Third Papuan People’s Congress was no different.
Instead of articulating social and economic grievances of indigenous Papuans, organizers of the congress voiced their political aspirations and interests. Included here was the declaration of an independent West Papuan state, appointment of its president and prime minister, hoisting the outlawed Morning Star flag, singing an “ethno-nationalistic” song and dance performances.
Failure to anticipate and respond to the “separatist” aspirations might spark suspicions that the security forces deliberately let the situation worsen. Deploying reinforcement troops from Jakarta or other parts of the country therefore would be justified.
Second, failure to prevent the congress from exposing separatist pleas complicated efforts to manage the problems. The government and security forces alike are certainly aware that the complex historical, legal, social, economic, cultural, political and security dimensions of the Papuan problem are all interrelated, overlapping and crosscutting.
Nonetheless, it is hard to find evidence that the government has adopted policies and strategies effectively to limit, direct and manage the protracted conflict in Papua. Rather than consistently channelling conflict into nonviolent behavior and providing incentives for peaceful accommodations, the security forces and other government units are more likely to maintain that their presence in the region is something important and necessary.
Third, conflict settlement in Papua is therefore impossible and undesirable. Conflict settlement implies dialogue and negotiations, which may lead to compromises, agreements and mutual commitments. Jakarta, however, tends to ignore the calls for dialogue. The central government’s offer for constructive communication as an alternative has not yet been substantiated.
It is natural that rebellion, often in the form of an armed movement, erupts when the government fails to fulfil its duties to protect people and their very basic rights. Freeport workers have the right to demand higher remuneration and indigenous Papuans have the right to gather, discuss and demand freedom.
The government and its agencies need to respond to the calls appropriately through dialogue and social economic development. Enforcing the law and maintaining order are a must, but civilized society and a democratic state such as Indonesia should not tolerate violence.
We strongly believe that violence in Papua is avoidable and conflict there can be resolved peacefully.
The writer is a lecturer at the Department of International Relations, Parahyangan Catholic University in Bandung and a member of the Academic Forum for Peace in Papua.
Comments (1)
Kobe Oser | Tue, 01/11/2011 - 19:11pm
The simple fact that the present generation of Indonesians who are unaware of the political status of West Papua, does not dismiss this generation to question the way how West Papua is being treated under the Indonesian flag. How RI wants to organise its state is of NO CONCERN WHATHOWEVER to the people of West Papua Melanesia. Under international law and standard, and with a UN in function, with active participation of EU-channelled funds and ASEAN development funding, we believe that the world community can actively take a stand in the re-establishing of the West Papua Melanesian state.Let's re-carry out the 1962 New York Agreement (based on the 1947 Canberra Agreement) on it's merites and purpose (Referendum obligation).RI has definately lost its legtimate sovereignity over West Papua Melanesia, another 40 years of autonomy promisces cannot suffice. Futhermore Papuans can easily afford a new future.