With Special Autonomy unable to address long-standing problems facing Papua, development acceleration is the latest government policy in place in the natural-resource-rich province.
The Unit for the Acceleration of Development in Papua and West Papua, known by its acronym UP4B, was formed through Presidential Regulation No. 65/2011. So, to what extent can the acceleration formula can be an appropriate solution, based on an accurate diagnosis of the present multidimensional complexity in Papua?
I consider the policy not only partial, but it also containing intrinsic risks/threats that will potentially worsen the situation in Papua.
According to the presidential regulation, the development acceleration is aimed at “improving people’s welfare” (Article 2) through “socioeconomic” as well as “sociopolitical and cultural development” (Article 5). In this far too general objective, there is no provision for the acceleration of the implementation of special autonomy in the form of affirmative policy for indigenous Papuans.
Instead of becoming the main spirit of the acceleration policy, affirmative actions for indigenous Papuans are only account for one of 10 action plans proposed in the development acceleration policy. More ironically, the affirmative actions are restricted to “giving opportunities and a quota to indigenous Papuan youths, men and women” in the recruitment of military and police personnel, state higher education institutions and “the provision of sporting facilities” (Action Plan 7).
The other nine action plans are general development agendas, with strong economic and investment interests. Apart from giant transportation infrastructure to link natural-recourse-rich regions across Papua, many mega-projects will be implemented. Among them is an industrial and trade zone in Arar, Sorong, a special economic zone in gas-rich Bintuni Bay, fish industrial centers in Sorong, Kamimana and Weri, oil and gas development in West Papua, mining industry in Timika and the infamous Merauke Food and Energy Estate (MIFEE).
While the benefits for native communities are not warranted, there are deep concerns that development acceleration will spark new waves of migration to Papua, which will in turn exacerbate the marginalization of indigenous Papuans. Combined with the extraction of resources, security operations, this marginalization threatens the survival, well-being and dignity of indigenous Papuans.
A preferential option to focus on the development for Papuan people is imperative within the context of abnormal demographic transition in Papua. As the result of the government-sponsored transmigration program and spontaneous migration attracted by a development boom, by 2010 the non-indigenous Papuan population exceeded the native Papuans at a ratio of 52-48. In some regencies such as Keerom and big cities the composition is up to 60-40 (BPS 2010). While the population growth rate of Papuans is only 1.84 percent a year, the migrant population is increasing by 10.82 percent a year. It is projected that by 2020 Papuans will account for only around 29 percent of the total population (Emslie, 2010).
Research I conducted with human rights advocate John Jonga earlier this year discovered a so-called migrant capture mechanism during the special autonomy era, which began in 2001. Migrants’ access to the process and benefit of development is better than that of native Papuans.
Facts and figures from Keerom regency speak for themselves. Indigenous Papuans account for only 40 percent of the population (BPS, 2010). Most of the native people live in rural areas such as Senggi, Web, Waris and Toe Hitam. The urban areas of Arso and Skanto are occupied mainly by non-Papuans (78 percent).
In such an imbalanced composition and distribution of the population, the struggle for socio-, economic, cultural and political power is dominated by migrants. Only six out of 21 local legislative council members and seven out of 39 heads of government agencies are native Papuans. The migrants also rule the trade and agriculture sector.
The domination of the non-Papuan population in the local power struggle is indicated in the relocation of the regency capital from the predominantly-Papuan district of Waris to the predominantly-migrant district of Arso, which was justified by Law No. 26/2002. This decision has moved the center of public services and development focus from the native Papuan area to a transmigration area. It also contributes to the growing disparity between migrants and native Papuans.
While development in education and the health sector has been significantly improved in Arso and Skanto, thanks to special autonomy funds, basic services in predominantly-native Papuans remain minimal.
Meanwhile, the predominantly Papuan areas are more and more securitized. Contrary to the small number of doctors and teachers, the number of security forces is high in rural areas. In Toe Hitam or Web, access to basic services is restricted by difficult geographical terrain, but ironically the government is able to consistently send military forces there.
These conditions have made Papuans feel deserted and oppressed. The socio-, political, economic, and cultural complexities prevent them from competing for access to the process and result of development.
The hazardous development practices in Papua have a correlation with the powerlessness of indigenous Papuans to participate in the process of determining what kind of development, and at what speed, they want in their own land. The determining power is in the hands of the central government and local elites who define, both discursively and in practice, what is good for them, and decide what (and who) can be sacrificed for that purpose.
Without re-articulation and refinement of strategies to implement affirmative policies for indigenous Papuans, the acceleration of development will solve nothing, and worsen the existing complexities in Papua. From this standpoint, the development acceleration amounts to a time bomb.
For Papuan people, the policy will potentially bring about more hazards in the forms of resource exploitation, marginalization and minoritization. The fast-growing population rate of migrants and the disparities between them and the native people engender a high risk of racial/ethnic plus religious conflicts. Politically, this will further fuel anti-Indonesia sentiment.
There is thus far no guarantee for the Papuans that their survival, wellbeing and dignity can be achieved within the developmentalist Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.
The writer is a researcher at Teratai Hati Papua Foundation (YTHP).
Papua Guy | Mon, 05/12/2011 - 12:12pm
@NKRI Harga Mati: can you please answer these questions I took from your posting: How do we get a better education? How and in what way can we leverage on the booming economy? Why are we the ONLY one have to set aside differences? Who is going provide jobs to us?
Please answer those questions.
NKRI Harga Mati | Sun, 04/12/2011 - 21:12pm
Now is the precise time for Papuans to integrate into Indonesian society. With current Indonesia economy is booming, prosperity is within reach, everyone in Papua must take advantage of it. Please set aside differences, get a higher education provided by Government of Republic of Indonesia, and get a better job and living. Progress is imminent, and everyone must take part and be proud of the nation.
West Papua Freedom | Sat, 03/12/2011 - 15:12pm
It is West Papua Rights Decision to be free.
Now all world knew indonesia has manipulated history to rob their islands.
Separated by seas Sumatra Borneo West Papua Moluccas Celebes have The Rights to Freedom as the new nations like East Timor did.
Everyday everywhere in indonesia will face the separatism activities until their arrogant indonesia is gone by nature.
filippo giancarlo | Fri, 02/12/2011 - 16:12pm
My belief is that 30,000 years of genetic, linguistic and cultural quasi-isolation between the Malay people and the Melanesian people leave long-lasting differences that cannot be erased just because the Indonesian fascist regime wants it.
Apart from having a fascist junta at the top of the country, Indonesian people are generally racist and ignorant of the relativism that would allow them to understand that other people may think differently.
The response of the Indonesian military junta to the reluctance of West Papuans to join Indonesia has been, for the last 49 years, systematic harassment, rape, torture, murder, and massacres. Such massive violations of the basic human rights of West Papuans by the Indonesian security forces, have made the struggle of West Papuans for freedom all the more legitimate. What should now be envisaged is an international tribunal for trying the crimes of Indonesian generals in West Papua.
The international community has a moral obligation to stop the slaughter of a people.
Despite the difficulty of integrating two people into a common one
Mauricio | Fri, 02/12/2011 - 11:12am
In his 2005 memoirs, the Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas recognized that the Timor-Timur problem had gone from being “a pebble in a shoe”, as he had publicly declared in the early 1990s, to a “veritable boulder”. The renowned Indonesia scholar Ben Anderson published a prescient and insighful article titled “Gravel in Jakarta’s Shoes” in the early 1990s in which he predicted that it was only a matter of time before “the very long ebb-tide of Indonesia’s imperial adventure” receeded. Sure enough, within a decade East Timor was independent. Why, according to Anderson, did Indonesia fail in Timor?
“By 1900…the engines of Dutch capitalism were running well, and in The Hague the ‘new imperial thinking’ had taken hold. This mean massive investment in communication infrastructure in the colony. It meant the institution, to be sure on a conservative scale, of modern education for the natives…Out of this explosive combination of development, education and repression grew, quite suddendly, the Indonesian nationalism that only a few decades later ended Dutch rule.”
Fast-forward thirty five years:
“Suharto and his generals, alas, were poorly informed about their own country’s modern history, and so they proceeded in the 1980s to do exactly what the Dutch had done at the beginning of the century…So large sums were invested in East Timor’s infrastructure, mainly but by no means entirely for military purposes. They established an elaborate hierarchy of schools, including an university. The number of pupils enrolled was fifty times higher than in the Portuguese era; illiteracy was reduced from 90 per cent in 1972 to 42 per cent in 1990. It was hoped that this would help instil the Indonesian language…and loyalty to Jakarta.”
We now know also how that second act played out. What are the prospects for the Indonesian state to succeed in a third act of this nationalist play in Papua?