Indonesia’s slight decline from 64th in 2011 to 63rd in 2012 in the list
of 178 countries ranked according to The Failed States Index 2012
recently was predictable and should not be exaggerated. The negative
points for Indonesia concern three important indicators: human rights
and law enforcement, demography and minority groups.
These three
indicators represent an interconnected phenomena rooted in the failure
of the state in managing its complex development.
The increasing
vulnerability of minority groups, as shown by the persecution of
Ahmadiyah followers or in the difficulties for Christians to build their
churches, clearly related to poor law enforcement and the absence of
the state in protecting its citizens’ basic rights. The cyclical
violence in Papua that is worsening has only added to the susceptibility
of citizens and the lack of state protection. In this deteriorating
security, demographic pressure might be highlighted as the underlying
factors, although indirectly.
The inclusion of demographic
factors in the measurement of state failure is particularly interesting
and unusual. Conventionally, demography is considered a background
variable and treated merely as aggregate statistics that can be
manipulated to suit the policy end. The increasing pressures from
demography indeed reflect the paralyzing structure of the economy and
the embedded injustices that have affected the majority of the
population.
In terms of demographic size, Indonesia is a giant
country. It is the fourth largest country after China, India and the US.
According to the 2010 census, Indonesia’s population stood at 237
million. The state has a herculean task in managing such a huge
population with a growing birth rate now that the family planning
program is no longer a national priority.
Indonesian demography
is not only about its large size and rapid growth, but is also about the
age structures, gender and ethnic composition, geographic distribution,
and more importantly, wealth distribution. Demography and policy are
closely interrelated. The demographic structure of a country is a result
of a policy, but at the same time the policy is also shaped by the
demographic structure.
The current system of general elections,
which is based on the one man one vote principle, is strongly dependant
on the age structure of the population. Democracy, in other words, is a
politics of numbers.
The failure of the state in managing the
silent but profound pressures from demography could lead to a massive
disaster, as it affects the majority of the population. This logic is
behind the reason of using demographic pressure as one of the important
indicators for measuring the state’s failure.
It should be noted
that the post-Soeharto governments no longer have the luxury of
exercising coercive power. The restraint to use coercion, however,
should not be the reason for the state to fail in protecting the human
rights of its citizens. It is a universal duty of the state everywhere
to protect citizens. In exercising its authority, the use of violence to
enforce the law and to enhance public order is justified and
legitimate.
The state as perceived by the The Fund for Peace
that releases the Failed States index constitutes not only the
government, but also the judiciary and the legislative powers. The
failure of the state therefore cannot be blamed only on the government.
The rampant corrupt practices found in the House of Representatives, the
judiciary and the government clearly indicate the paralyzed system of
politics in this country.
Corruption is no longer a sign of
individual greediness but has been systematically embedded within the
political system. The promise of reform after the demise of Soeharto’s
authoritarian regime is being hijacked by vested interest groups that
betray the majority of Indonesian people.
At present there is
apparently a misperception, particularly at the global level, that
Indonesia could manage its economy in a promising way. Indonesia’s
status as a G20 member provides a strong impression that Indonesia is a
successful economy. Yet as the membership is solely based on the
aggregate data on the macro national economy, it tends to hide many
other economic features, especially the income distribution of its
population.
The much talked issue, especially among economists,
about the increasing number of people known as the middle class while
might be the case but still the majority of Indonesian citizens
undeniably belong to the poor or near poor groups. The glittering malls
and cafes almost in all cities are misleadingly perceived as a sign of
modernity and cosmopolitan life, as only a small percentage of
Indonesian citizens enjoy them. The majority of Indonesian citizens
continue living in very vulnerable economic conditions without job
security or social insurance.
With the tag as a state in danger,
Indonesia should therefore be perceived as a healthy reminder that the
ultimate goal of creating the Republic by our founding fathers is to
protect the Indonesian citizens, socially, economically and politically;
no more, no less. Indonesian citizens, according to the Constitution,
are all Indonesians regardless of their ethnicity, religion or origin.
The
Failed State Index 2012 takes us to Thomas Friedman’s perceptive
commentary back in the beginning of 2000 that Indonesia (and Russia) are
messy states, and they are too big to fail.
The writer is a
researcher at the research center for society and culture, Indonesian
Institute of Sciences (LIPI), and the author of Looking for Indonesia 2:
The Limits of Social Engineering (LIPI Press, 2010).