The issues of Papua are truly complex social issues in which multidimensional aspects are involved. Today’s critical situation in Papua is attributed to accumulative degenerative public policies that have been imposed on this richly endowed island for almost five decades. Acknowledging the root causes and implementing the right solutions are two daunting challenges for us if we want to truly save Papua.
Degenerative
public policy is a by-product of degenerative politics. Both are two
sides of the same coin. In essence, degenerative public policy is a
poorly designed policy whose outcome in society is degenerating in
nature.
According to Schneider and Ingram (1997), such policy is
made in a condition characterized by unequal distribution of political
power, social construction separating the deserving from the
undeserving, and an institutional culture legitimizing strategic,
manipulative and deceptive patterns of communication and uses of
political power.
The policy in this sense is framed accordingly
to favor certain groups of people, since target populations in a society
have different political power, access, resources and capabilities to
construct social reality and narratives on which a policy-making system
is based.
In other words, degenerative public policy is a policy
that pessimistically suggests that underprivileged citizens will be
targeted with policies that actually do little to help them, creating a
vicious circle of degenerative politics. Generative public policies are
often found in developing countries where natural resources are
abundant.
The Indonesian jurisdiction of the island of Papua,
which consists of Papua and West Papua provinces, is one of Indonesia’s
largest islands and one of the world’s richest reserves for copper,
uranium, gold and silver.
But, Papua and West Papua provinces
are still the two provinces whose Human Development Index (HDI) is among
the lowest in Indonesia – at least when we look at the general pattern
of socioeconomic quality of life there; where, according to the Central
Statistics Agency’s (BPS) 2011 Trends of the Selected Socioeconomic
Indicators of Indonesia, the two provinces combined contribute 2.1
percent of Indonesia’s gross regional domestic product (GRDP) for oil
and gas, and 2.2 percent for the non-oil and gas sector.
Thus,
it can be argued that the stepping down of Soeharto and the embracing of
a new democratic era since 1998 has not solved degenerative politics in
Papua. Until today, the Indonesian government is still struggling
against serious insurgency movements that aim to separate Papua from
Indonesia’s jurisdiction.
Papua is an obvious case where
degenerative public policy is prevalent in a corrupt society exacerbated
by weak law enforcement, weak democracy where transparency is hardly
ever found, and conditions in which powerful parts of society
disproportionately supersede other parties in many respects.
As a
result, degenerative public policies have generated four different
kinds of separated society. Degenerative politics have placed political
elites, business communities and the central government as the powerful
stakeholders (powerful and positively constructed); Papua’s local
indigenous people, however, have become dependents (positively
constructed as “good” people but relatively needy or helpless, who have
little or no political power); Papua’s local insurgents are deemed
deviants (possessing virtually no political power and are negatively
constructed as undeserving, violent, mean, and so forth); and groups of
reformers who aim to reform Papua economically, politically and socially
are considered the contenders (powerful but negatively constructed).
Powerful stakeholders often view this group with suspicion.
Consequently,
the accumulation of degenerative public policies in Papua has at least
generated four main problems: distrust and misperceptions among local
Papuans toward the central government, discrimination and
marginalization in society, the unexpected outcome of special autonomy
and an effect of trauma upon local Papuans who live with continual
ongoing conflicts.
Looking ahead, Indonesia obviously needs
strong and strategic leadership that knows how to implement at least
five main objectives through a strategically overarching model of
engagement.
First, we need a strategic leader who can
acknowledge the bias and weaknesses within the government, including
those of previous governments.
Second, the President, as
commander-in-chief and a strategic leader, needs to be open-minded and
accommodative toward diverse perspectives held by various stakeholders.
Third,
the President, along with other policy stakeholders, needs to approach
and solve problems in Papua from an overarching perspective using
historical and innovative approaches coupled with the courage to take
risks.
Fourth, the endgame state of solving the issues in Papua must bring degenerative politics to the end.
Fifth,
the government needs to formulate and exercise an overarching,
entire-governmental campaign to deal both with the provinces’ root issue
— degenerative politics — and current symptoms.
At an
operational level, the government needs to engage in these five
interconnected measures by using all available instruments of national
power: the economy, information, the military, intelligence, diplomacy,
financial acumen and law enforcement; as well-crafted soft and hard
power will generate the smart power required to deal with the daunting
challenges of Papua.
The first measure is psychological
engagement in order to truly win the hearts and minds of the people in
Papua. The second measure is law enforcement in order to deal with any
abuse of power, including the allegation of mismanaged funding
allocations from 2002–2010 as reported by the Supreme Audit Agency
(BPK). The third measure is public diplomacy in order to win the support
from domestic and international stakeholders. However, good public
diplomacy must be accompanied by a set of real actions in order to gain
credibility and trust.
The fourth measure is counter-insurgency
(COIN) engagement in order to neutralize separatist movements. An
insurgency is not simply random violence; it is rather directed and
focused violence aimed at achieving a political objective. Therefore, in
its very nature, COIN must be a combination of offensive, defensive and
stability operations (civil security, civil control, essential
services, governance and economic infrastructure development). In
addition to that, the government also needs to trace and halt any
financial support for Papua’s separatist movements.
COIN is an
extremely complex form of warfare. At its core, COIN is a struggle for
the population’s support, so the protection, welfare and support
extended toward the Papuan people are vital for its success.
The
fifth measure is the acceleration of economic development that is truly
based on a well-designed platform of public policy so that the
government can ensure that degenerative public policies are not
implemented in the future; and development in its widest sense:
economic, social and political takes place in Papua.
Having
succeeded in this strategic and overarching engagement, the government
will be well in advance of the separatist movements whose main
components consist of mass bases, united fronts, political warfare,
armed wings and international support.
And last but not least,
Sir Liddell Hart, the prominent British strategist, once argued that
while the horizon of strategy was bounded by a war, grand strategy
looked beyond the war to the subsequent peace. The endgame state of any
engagement in Papua must be strategic and overarching in order to create
a lasting peace and sustainable development.
The critical
success factor to achieve this goal is to think and act strategically:
be honest with ourselves, understand our past mistakes, clearly
acknowledge the real problems, address the underlying causes — not
merely act as a fire extinguisher to treat the perennial symptoms — and
dare to take risks and adopt innovative ways to solve the chronic
problems. “Who thinks wins”, and a winning nation is a thinking one. Now
it’s time for us to think clearly and act for Papua. If we fail to save
Papua, Indonesia’s national security will be in peril.
The
writer is a PhD Fulbright presidential scholar at the GMU School of
Public Policy and was an international fellow from Indonesia at the US
National Defense University, Washington, DC in 2007. He currently
resides in Washington, DC. The opinions expressed are his own.
Comments:
If Indonesian decision makers
and legislators are sensible enough, they should read and develop the
input given in this article.
The problems are clear, past
degenerative politics have created a vicious cycle, very weak leadership
under President Yudhoyono, and unclear guidance in truly fixing the
vicious cycle of problems in Papua.
I agree that self-denial and
pompous speeches by our President and Indonesian leadership about
Papua’s real condition will not be able to keep Papua from being
separated from Indonesia.
I am personally concerned about
Indonesian unity, so if the Indonesian government still wants to keep
Papua in Indonesia, it has no choice but to be honest with itself and
fix the underlying issues in Papua accordingly.
Too much
conspiracy and collusion have been driven by short-term interests among
elite stakeholders in Papua. Please be open to any breakthrough
solutions and be brave to take risks.
This is one of the most
critical national issues of Indonesia, please do something real and
concrete or otherwise this nation will collapse.
Mark S
Good
governance and strong leadership are the key to solving Papua’s issues.
This is imperative if Indonesian people still want to keep Papua in
Indonesia.
These have been missing from Indonesian political
leadership for decades. SBY was once expected to become “a savior”, but
he ended up being a fiasco for Papua, and maybe for the whole nation.
SBY’s
ambitious rhetoric and agenda have been hardly achieved. To accomplish
all important missions in Papua in two years is a “mission impossible”.
Jaques P
Has the Indonesian government been honest about everything in Papua?
This is the key point if it wants to keep Papua integrated under its jurisdiction.
I
see that the Indonesian government has nurtured so called “degenerative
politics” by carrying out separate engagements with an unclear purpose.
For example, in the international arena, the government keeps
projecting that everything is fine in Papua. I am telling you that this
self-denial will eventually blow back to Indonesia.
Components of
the security apparatus in Papua have been competing with each other as
guidance from the president remains unclear.
The government
“allowed” corruption between 2002 and 2010 to be ignored as this was
Jakarta’s way of winning the “hearts and minds” of local leaders.
The
Indonesian government needs to realize that it cannot win hearts and
minds by bribing local leaders who can then suddenly afford to buy
luxurious penthouses in Manhattan, New York, while letting the local
Papuan people live in destitution.
Mr. President, as the commander-in-chief, you are responsible for such degenerative conditions in Papua.
Please, use your formal and informal power to save Papua, please narrow the gap between your political rhetoric and reality.
Pete Ahern
I
was once working in a global security consulting firm that observed the
objective condition of Papua. This article absolutely portrays what is
hidden in Papua: Degenerative politics.
That’s the most proper terminology to use.
First,
I am not sure that the Indonesian government is objective and honest
with itself in looking at what has been going on in Papua.
Second,
I personally argue that President SBY does not want to take the risk as
a leader and is too afraid to lose his popularity.
As he
becomes unclear about his position and doesn’t know what he actually
should do as a commander-in-chief, his subordinates: the Indonesian
military (TNI), the police, and all the state apparatus become victims
(some of them who are honest sacrificed, while others who enjoy the
“benefit” of degenerative politics are somehow saved).
There’s too much conspiracy, and there’s too much to say about degenerative politics in Papua as described by this article.
No
wonder that according to the Indonesian Defense Committee (including
the TNI commander, police chief and head of national intelligence) each
of them has different view about what has been going in Papua.
This
is a mistake of the President as commander-in-chief, who has never been
clear about many things in Indonesia including regarding what is going
on in Papua.
His lame and crippled leadership has only caused more trouble for Papua.
Abdul Almasih
The
Indonesian government needs to make a great policy leap and start
winning the hearts and minds of Papua’s indigenous residents.
The problems stemming from the diversity of ethnicity, religion and tribes in Indonesia need new and different solutions.
However, an achievement in one part of Indonesia cannot necessarily be replicated in Papua.
Antonius Joko